Civil Rights Complaint Template

Why this template is built the way it is

Three things kill these cases. This skeleton is built to survive all three.

1 — The Arsberry problem

Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001), held that a high per-minute phone rate is a "functional tax," not a First Amendment injury. If you plead "the rates are too high," you lose on the merits. So this complaint does not attack the price. It attacks the total deprivation of any affordable channel of contact and the taking and forfeiture of money already paid — deposits seized, balances zeroed, funds kept after a rejected message. Those are different rights Arsberry never reached.

2 — The Monell problem

A county is liable only for its own policy, not for what a contractor did. The fix: plead the exclusive franchise/commission contract itself as the official policy — a written instrument adopted by the governing body. That skips the "pattern and practice" swamp entirely. The contract IS the policy.

3 — The capacity problem

In some states the sheriff is a state actor for jail operations (McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)), which defeats county Monell liability and raises Eleventh Amendment immunity. The fix is a defendant matrix (Section II): plead the County when the sheriff is a county policymaker for jail administration; plead the governing board by ratification, the official individually, and Ex parte Young prospective relief when the sheriff is a state actor.

Court's own warningDo not dump every Monell theory into one generic block. Pick the theory your facts support — here, express policy, with ratification pleaded as a clearly labeled alternative — and plead it cleanly.

Section I — Caption

                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
              FOR THE [____________] DISTRICT OF [STATE]
                       [___________] DIVISION

[PLAINTIFF NAME], [and [SECOND PLAINTIFF NAME],]   §
                                                    §
            Plaintiff[s],                           §
                                                    §
      v.                                            §   Civil Action No. ____________
                                                    §
[COUNTY] COUNTY, [STATE]; [SHERIFF NAME],           §   JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
in [his/her] official [and individual]              §
capacit[ies]; [GOVERNING BODY]; [VENDOR             §
ENTITY, e.g. GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION            §
d/b/a VIAPATH TECHNOLOGIES]; [FINANCIAL             §
SUBSIDIARY, e.g. TOUCHPAY HOLDINGS, LLC             §
d/b/a GTL FINANCIAL SERVICES]; and                  §
DOES 1-10,                                          §
                                                    §
            Defendant[s].                           §

Section II — Defendant matrix (choose your configuration)

Drafting instructionDetermine, under your state's law, whether the sheriff is a COUNTY or STATE policymaker for JAIL ADMINISTRATION specifically — not law enforcement generally. The court decides this as a question of state law. Use the matching configuration and delete the other.

Configuration A — Sheriff is a COUNTY policymaker for jail administration (most states).

The County (entity liable under Monell for its express policy)
The Sheriff in official capacity (redundant with County; some filers drop this)
The Sheriff in individual capacity (for damages)
The private vendor and its financial subsidiary (as joint state actors)

Configuration B — Sheriff is a STATE actor for jail operations (e.g. Alabama-type).

The County Commission / governing board, on a ratification theory (it approved and funds the contract)
The Sheriff in individual capacity only (Eleventh Amendment bars official-capacity damages against a state actor)
The Sheriff in official capacity for prospective injunctive relief only, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
The private vendor and its financial subsidiary (as joint state actors)

Section III — Jurisdiction and venue

1. This action arises under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Subject-matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)–(4) (civil rights).

2. Supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because they form part of the same case or controversy.

3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events occurred here and one or more Defendants reside here.

4. [If seeking it:] Declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202; injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.

Section IV — Parties

5. Plaintiff [NAME] is [an incarcerated person confined at [FACILITY]] / [an adult who maintains contact with an incarcerated person and pays for that contact through Defendants' system].

6. [If using a co-plaintiff — recommended.] Plaintiff [NAME] is a non-incarcerated adult who [is the [relationship] of the incarcerated Plaintiff] and who deposited money into and was charged by Defendants' system. This Plaintiff is not a "prisoner" under the PLRA, owes no exhaustion of jail grievances, and faces no "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Why a co-plaintiff mattersThe outside correspondent has an independent First Amendment interest (Procunier v. Martinez), is free of PLRA exhaustion and strike risk, and is the person who actually paid. In Arsberry itself the non-prisoner plaintiffs' claims survived while the prisoners' were barred for non-exhaustion. Let the outside plaintiff carry the property and access claims where possible.

7. Defendant [COUNTY] County is a political subdivision of [STATE] and a "person" subject to suit under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

8. Defendant [SHERIFF NAME] is the Sheriff of [COUNTY] County and, under [STATE] law, the final policymaker for administration of the Jail. [Cite the state statute/constitutional provision. In Configuration B, instead allege the sheriff acts for the State in jail operations and name the governing board as the county policymaker that ratified the contract.]

9. Defendant [VENDOR ENTITY] is a private corporation that, under an exclusive contract with the County, operates the telephone, video, and electronic-messaging systems for the Jail. It acts under color of state law because it performs a function traditionally reserved to the government within a detention facility, under an exclusive franchise granted and regulated by the County.

10. Defendant [FINANCIAL SUBSIDIARY] is a wholly owned subsidiary of [VENDOR ENTITY] and the licensed money transmitter that holds, in a custodial capacity, the funds deposited by Plaintiffs. [If its Terms admit it holds funds "in a custodial capacity ... as an agent of its customers," quote that admission.]

11. Defendants Does 1–10 are persons or entities whose identities are presently unknown. Plaintiff will amend when they are identified.

Section V — Factual allegations

Drafting instructionPlead specific, dated facts. Generic allegations get dismissed under Twombly/Iqbal. Replace every bracket with what actually happened, with dates.

The exclusive contract (the policy).

12. On or about [DATE], [COUNTY] County, acting through [its governing body / the Sheriff as final policymaker], entered into an exclusive contract with [VENDOR] granting the sole right to provide communications services to people in the Jail and the public who contact them. [Obtain via public-records request; attach as Exhibit A. This is the most important document in the case.]

13. Under that contract, the County receives a "commission" of [____]% of the revenue collected from Plaintiffs and the class. The County's revenue rises as the charges to families rise.

14. The contract [eliminated / restricted] in-person visitation [and/or restricted physical mail], leaving paid telephone, video, and messaging as the only means of contact. [Plead the specific restrictions — the heart of the total-deprivation theory.]

The forced-deposit and forfeiture mechanism (the taking).

15. To send a single message costing about $[____], a user must first deposit a minimum of $[____], plus a transaction fee of $[____]. The user cannot pay only for what is used.

16. Defendants retain the unspent balance and benefit financially from holding it.

17. Defendants' written terms provide that an account becomes inactive after [____] days and the balance is then subject to forfeiture, with refunds available only while the account is active. [Quote the clause; attach the Terms.]

18. Defendants [seized / zeroed / forfeited] $[____] of Plaintiff's deposited funds on or about [DATE] without notice or hearing. [If a regulator already found this unlawful — e.g., the CFPB's Nov. 14, 2024 consent order against these entities — allege it.]

19. On or about [DATE], [the incarcerated person] attempted to contact Plaintiff [by call / message], and the contact was blocked solely because the account held insufficient funds. [Your concrete, dated deprivation. A blocked call with a timestamp beats any abstract argument.]

20. As a direct result, Plaintiffs were deprived of contact, lost money paid into the system, and [any further specific injury — inability to reach counsel, missed legal deadline, etc.].

Section VI — Exhaustion (incarcerated plaintiff only)

21. [If an incarcerated plaintiff is included, plead PLRA exhaustion, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).] Plaintiff [NAME] exhausted all available administrative remedies by [filing grievance no. ____ on DATE and appealing through all levels], or alternatively no remedy was "available" because [state why].

22. The non-incarcerated Plaintiff is not subject to the PLRA and owes no exhaustion.

Section VII — Claims for relief

Drafting instructionPlead only the counts your facts support. A clean three-count complaint beats a ten-count shotgun.

Count I — § 1983: First Amendment, total deprivation of contact (all Defendants)

23. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

24. Plaintiffs have a clearly established First Amendment right to communicate. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). A detention-context restriction is valid only if reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, and a central factor is whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

25. By [eliminating in-person visitation and restricting mail] and making paid services the only channel, then setting that channel's terms to extract maximum revenue, Defendants closed all reasonable alternatives. This is not about price; it is that no affordable channel remains at all.

26. The deprivation results from the County's official policy — the exclusive contract — which was the moving force behind the violation.

Count II — § 1983: Fourteenth Amendment, deprivation of property without due process (all Defendants)

27. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

28. Plaintiffs have a property interest in the funds they deposited and in money paid for services not rendered.

29. Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of that property — through forced over-deposit, forfeiture of inactive balances, and retention of funds for rejected or undelivered messages — without notice and without any opportunity to be heard, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

30. The deprivation results from the County's official policy adopting and profiting from this fee-and-forfeiture structure, the moving force behind the violation.

Optional countIf your facts include an indigent inmate prevented from reaching a lawyer or court, add an access-to-courts count under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Lewis requires pleading an ACTUAL INJURY — a specific legal claim lost or impeded. Do not add this count without that fact.

Count III — Monell liability against the County (express policy)

31. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

32. A municipality is liable under § 1983 when execution of its own official policy inflicts the injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. An express policy adopted by the governing body is the clearest basis; no pattern of prior violations is needed. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).

33. The exclusive contract — granting the franchise, authorizing the commission, and [eliminating in-person contact] — is a deliberate choice by the County's final policymaker[s] for jail administration. It is the official policy of the County.

34. That policy was the moving force behind the deprivations in Counts I and II. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).

Alternative — Configuration B onlyIf the sheriff is a state actor for jail operations, replace or supplement Count III with a RATIFICATION theory: the County Commission / governing board reviewed, approved, and funds the contract, adopting it as official county policy. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). Keep it as a clearly labeled alternative; do not merge it into the express-policy count.

Count IV — State-law claims, supplemental (vendor Defendants)

35. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

36. Conversion / breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant [FINANCIAL SUBSIDIARY] held Plaintiffs' funds in a custodial capacity as agent for Plaintiffs and converted them by forfeiting inactive balances and retaining payment for undelivered services.

37. Unjust enrichment. Defendants were unjustly enriched by retaining funds to which they had no rightful claim.

38. [If applicable in your state:] Violation of [STATE] unclaimed-property law by failing to report and escheat abandoned balances, and/or violation of [STATE]'s deceptive-trade-practices statute through contradictory refund representations.

Section VIII — Prayer for relief

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

(a) Declare that Defendants' policies and practices violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
(b) Enjoin Defendants from [eliminating affordable contact / forfeiting deposited funds / retaining payment for undelivered messages], and order restoration of in-person visitation; [In Configuration B, frame injunctive relief against the state-actor official under Ex parte Young.]
(c) Award compensatory damages to be proven at trial;
(d) Award nominal damages for the constitutional violation;
(e) [Where supported:] Award punitive damages against the individual and private Defendants;
(f) Award costs and, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, reasonable attorney's fees [available if you later obtain counsel; a pro se non-attorney generally cannot recover § 1988 fees, but plead it to preserve the issue];
(g) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just.

Section IX — Jury demand

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).

Section X — Signature block

Dated: [DATE]                    Respectfully submitted,


                                 _______________________________
                                 [PLAINTIFF NAME], Pro Se
                                 [MAILING ADDRESS]
                                 [PHONE]
                                 [EMAIL]

Attachments to file with the complaint

Civil Cover Sheet (JS-44)
Summons for each defendant
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (AO 240). An incarcerated plaintiff must also file a certified six-month trust-fund-account statement, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).
Exhibit A: the exclusive contract (public-records request)
Exhibit B: the vendor's Terms of Use / deposit terms (forfeiture and refund clauses)
Exhibit C: your transaction record / account screenshot showing the forced minimum and any forfeiture
Exhibit D: record of the blocked communication (call log, screenshot) with date
Exhibit E (if it exists): any regulator finding against these defendants (e.g., the CFPB consent order)

Key authorities (verify each before filing)

Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) — municipal liability requires an official policy or custom that is the moving force.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) — a single decision by a final policymaker can be official policy.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) — moving-force causation standard.
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) — ratification; the final policymaker is identified under state law.
McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) — whether a sheriff acts for county or state is decided function-by-function under state law.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) — prison-restriction standard; the "alternative means" factor.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) — outside correspondent's First Amendment interest.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) — access to courts; actual-injury requirement.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) — prospective injunctive relief against a state official.
Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001) — the rate-as-tax holding this complaint is drafted to avoid; know it before filing in any circuit that follows it.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) — plausibility pleading standard.